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Risk Perception
and Drug Safety Evaluation*
Han B. Vertinsky and Donald A. Wehrung**
Introduction
Do regulators need to concern themselves with public risk
perceptions? Would the scarce social resources dedicated to the pursuit
of safety not be more usefully deployed in improving the scientific basis
of regulation?1 These questions are asked repeatedly by professional
risk assessors who must use significant resources to defend their actions
(or inactions) and explain delays in the regulatory decision process. The
prevalent view among risk assessors is that groups with distorted
information and lack of understanding are subject to unreasonable fears.
Regulators are frustrated because providing accurate information rarely
satisfies public complaints. Indeed, in attempts to be open, objective and
accurate, scientists often create suspicions and complaints of
*

This paper is based on one used to open a Workshop on Risk Perception and
Drug Safety Evaluation, held at Ottawa on March 29-30, 1989 [hereinafter Ottawa
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1 Johnson, Risk Perceptionand Drug Safety Evaluation in CanadianRegulatory
Agencies, presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.
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indifference to safety. They are continuously forced to defend their own
integrity and the risk assessment process.
Basing risk judgments on objective scientific evidence using the
standard risk analysis paradigm fails to consider the subjective elements
of risk perception. It is therefore important for decisioi makers to be
aware of public concern for health risks in order that risk management
decisions properly reflect such concern and ultimately receive public
2
acceptance.
In this paper we present a framework which articulates the linkages
between public risk perceptions and the regulatory process. The paper
explores alternative types of communication strategies and their role in
improving public safety because risk communications can be a vital
factor in managing such linkages. In the last section of the paper the
framework is employed to analyze communication strategies in drug
safety evaluation.
Why Knowledge of Risk Perceptions Is Important
There are several reasons why government regulators charged with
the promotion and protection of health need to know about the risk
perceptions of different groups in our society and how they develop and
change. These reasons are discussed below.
a Risk perceptions can influence the public policy agenda
concerning the allocationof resourcesand regulationsto reduce risks.
Since risk is ubiquitous, paying attention and evaluating all potential
risks is bound to stop all productive activities. Fears become a major
social force in determining the political agenda. 3 Risk perceptions are
formed both by direct experience and from the words and deeds of
2

Krewski, Somers & Birkwood, Risk Perception in a DecisionMaking Context,

5 ENviRONmENTAL CARcNOGEmsS REvIEwS 175 (1987).
3 Somers, Introductory Remarks to Conference on Risk Perception and Drug
Safety Evaluation,presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.
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influential others.4 The perceived riskiness of various hazards is often
at variance with scientific judgment about risks. 5 Thus, attention to
public fears may mold a public policy agenda which focuses on some
highly feared, but improbable, dangers to society rather than less feared,
but more likely hazards. "Policy directed primarily at alleviating public
anxieties can result in large expenditures having low cost effectiveness.
Conversely, serious risks may also be neglected due to public
6
indifference."
- Risk perceptions can influence market processes. When
perceptionsreflect lack of information,there is "marketfailure," i.e.,
loss of social welfare.
Perceptions influence what people buy, so unjustified fears or
misplaced over-confidence by consumers may lead to serious economic
distortions. That is, when individuals make decisions, the underlying
benefits and costs they consider in choosing among alternative options
may not correspond to the true consequences of these options. For
example, patients may avoid using certain medications or procedures
because of misplaced fears, thus increasing the risks to which they are
exposed. Alternatively, patients may gravitate toward medications and
procedures that appear safer than they are. The major justification for
regulatory action in market economies is market failure. The regulator
may be forced to intervene in market processes to improve individual
choices and prevent serious dislocations of market processes resulting
from unjustified public fears.
- Risk perceptions can influence individual behaviour and
contribute to or detractfrom risk management efforts.
4

M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE

SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENmAL DANGERS (1982).

5 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: UnderstandingPerceived
Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181 (R.

Schwing & W. Albers, Jr. eds. 1980).
6 Supra note 2, at 203.
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Since exposure to risk depends in part on the behaviour of
individuals (e.g., compliance behaviour), and, since risk perceptions
motivate "safety oriented" behaviour, such perceptions determine the
effectiveness of different protection programs. For example, patients
typically do not guard childrens' access to medication in a sufficiently
careful manner (e.g., through locked medicine cabinets) because they
underestimate the risks. This knowledge may indicate that certain types
of packaging designs for drugs are especially dangerous for children. 7
Similarly, if the regulator expects patients to feel invulnerable to taking
excess medication, he may restrict availability of prescription and overthe-counter medications.
To modify peoples' behaviour, one must understand the way they
think about risks in different social contexts 8 and the way such
thinking leads to decisions, actions and responses to risk
communications. 9 The role that a person plays (e.g., voter, member
of an interest group, patient, family member, regulator) is triggered by a
situation and by the social and historical context in which a risk is
presented. These factors affect how (and whether) a person thinks about
risk, what risk values are considered and how attitudes and risk
perceptions are structured. Attempts to modify behaviour must be
informed by detailed knowledge of how a person thinks about risks and
how new information is likely to be processed. Expert intuition is no
substitute for experience. A risk communication that is not understood
and fails to motivate the desired behaviour cannot be considered
7 Kline & Leiss, The Contribution of Risk Perception Studies to the
Formulation of Health Hazard Warnings, presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra;
MacGregor, Strategies for Communicating Risk Effectively: The Use of Drug

WarningLabels, presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.

8 Whyte, Studies of Risk Perception in Canada, presentation to Ottawa
Workshop, supra.
9 Gregory, CurrentResearch Directionsin Risk Perceptionin the United States,

presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.
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successful, no matter how highly it is rated by its own creators. 10
- Risk perceptionscan affect how new risk evidence is evaluated.
Risk perceptions constitute a filter for attending to and interpreting
new data and information.1 1 This is true not only for citizens at large,
but also for experts and politicians. Indeed the regulatory process itself
may experience distortions in communications and risk assessments.
For example, Philbrook 12 observed that few spontaneous adverse
reactions to drugs are reported by physicians whose assessments are
biased by their prior risk perceptions. This behaviour reduces
opportunities for learning. Knowledge of risk perceptions may be used
to improve communications in the regulatory process and to ensure
proper learning over time.

- Risk perceptionscan affect views of the integrityof the regulatory
process and trust in risk assessors.
Since trust and confidence are major factors in reducing unfounded
fears, it is important to enhance the perceived integrity of the regulatory
process. The dissonance created by disconfirming evidence may be
resolved by reducing the confidence in the data and in both the process
and experts which generated it. 13 Understanding the dynamics of risk
perception is fundamental to the design of risk communication strategies
that do not threaten the perceived integrity of the regulatory and risk
management process. Failure to protect the perceived integrity of the
process will inevitably amplify public risk perceptions.
As we have indicated, "risk perception" is a key variable that
permeates risk policy and risk management processes, including
initiation, risk identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation, risk
10 Id.
11 R. NISBET& L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGmS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JuDGMENT (1980).

12 IndustryPerspectives,presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.
13 Supra note 11.
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reduction and risk controlphases. 14
Table 1
The Risk Policy/Management Process (OECD 1983)
Phase
Initiation
Risk Identification

Risk Estimation
Risk Evaluation

Risk Reduction
Risk Control

Explanation
Begin process in response to, or in anticipation of, a
perceived problem.
Observe and recognize new risk parameters, new
relationships among existing parameters, or perceived
changes in the magnitude of existing parameters.
Quantify the probabilities and consequence values for an
identified risk.
Define acceptable levels of risk to individuals or society.
Includes identifying adverse consequences and relating
exposure to consequences.
Lower the probability of occurrence and/or the value of a
risk consequence, thereby reducing the magnitude of risk.
Determine whether risk reduction efforts have succeeded.

Table 1 summarizes these phases. In each phase, however, different
aspects of risk perception and its formation may be dominant, and
different aspects of research may inform risk regulators and managers.
Risk Perception in the Policy/Management Process
Figure 1, below, identifies the major pathways through which risk
perceptions play a key role in shaping the regulatory process.

14 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCT
SAFETY: RISK MANAGEMENT AND CosT-BENEFrr ANALYSiS (1983).
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Figure 1
The Regulatory Process of Risk Reduction
and the Impact of Various Types of Risk Perceptions

Risk Perception
(" Culture

Risk Policy and ManagementProcess

)

Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the principal direct and
indirect modes through which risk perceptions enter or affect the
2 RISK-Issues in Health &Safety 281 [Fall 19911

indirect modes through which risk perceptions enter or affect the
regulatory process. We distinguish two basic types of risk perceptions:
(a) those which are held by groups as integrated judgments of riskiness
of options and their acceptability and (b) those which relate solely to
facts (i.e., mainly probability estimates for consequence values). The
discord alluded to in the introduction to this paper between the risk
perceptions of professional risk assessors and the perceptions of
laypeople occurs mainly in the domain of integrated riskiness
judgments. Experts tend to form such judgments by combining
probabilities and some simple quantitative expressions of consequences
(mainly fatality rates). Laypeople, on the other hand, tend to focus more
on consequences described by multiple attributes that relate not only to
the final outcomes of a hazard but also to the context of exposure. These
judgments tend to discount the importance of probability in determining
riskiness and acceptability of risky options. Thus the discord has two
dimensions, one based on factual concerns and the other on social
values. On questions of facts concerning likelihood and consequences
the assessor can legitimately point to his superior information,
understanding and analysis relative to the lay public. On questions of
values and preferences, however, the public is sovereign.
Ideally the regulatory process should improve public knowledge of
facts and analysis, so that choices reflect public preferences that are
informed and well thought out. 15 This is what we call informed
consent. Alternatively, the regulator should glean from risk perceptions
the values held by the public in order to make policy choices on their
behalf in accordance with these values. This process can be referred to
as imputed informed consent since the regulator chooses as the public
would have chosen had it been in possession of appropriate knowledge.
Dismissing public risk perceptions as a drag on the regulatory process is
15 Coppock, The NRC Project on Risk Perception and Communication,

presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.

Vertinsky and Webrung: Risk Perception and Drug Safety 289

both unjustifiable and imprudent. Ignoring perceptual biases in the.
judgments of experts is often a cause of lower quality "safety"
decisions.
However, Lichtenstein et al. 16 caution regulators to recognize that
public preferences are often inconsistent and inadequately developed.
Moreover, people do not always want what they say they want, and the
public is sometimes misinformed about key aspects of a potential
hazard. Therefore regulators and other social decision makers are urged
to have a backbone, able to go against (while never ignoring) public
desires, and a heart, caring for and respecting (but not always
17
acquiescing to) public views.
The Initiationand Risk IdentificationPhase
The regulatory agenda is determined in the initiation and risk
identification phase. Part of the agenda emerges routinely from ongoing
work of the regulatory agency and its formal responsibilities (e.g.,
monitoring and reporting systems). Part of it is determined by scientific
priorities (formal choice of candidates for risk assessments). Also, an
increasing part of it is determined by public complaints and the influence
of a variety of interest groups. Clark has observed, for example that: 18
While American drug regulators and risk assessors are
being condemned as overly conservative by collective social
welfare studies.., powerful, articulate, and convincing
consumer groups are simultaneously attacking them for
"caving in to industry" and neglecting their responsibility to
assure the public's safety.
He concludes that: 19
16 When Lives are in Your Hands: Dilemmas of the Societal Decision Maker 24
(1989) (Working paper available from Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon).
17 Id. at 24.
18 Witches, Floods and Wonder Drugs. Historical Perspectives on Risk
Management, in SOcIErAL RISK AssESsMENT: How

SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 8 (R.

Schwing & W. Albers, Jr. eds. 1980).
19 Id.
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For better or worse, public safety is now and is likely to
remain a primarily political issue. Scientific data and
economic analyses - even of the inordinately high quality
encountered in the drug field - are simply not going to be
the central issue in even the most technical of risk decisions.
In Canada, perhaps because of its consensus oriented culture and
consultative style of risk handling,2 0 health risks are perceived as
important individual problems rather than as an important part of the
public agenda. 2 1 However, spill-over through the American mass
media and through economic and institutional linkages is likely to
internalize safety issues raised in the U.S. and mold the agenda.
The nature of fear is asymmetrical - it is easier to prevent fear than
to reassure people who are afraid.2 2 This means that preventative
measures to "inoculate" Canadian risk perceptions by appropriate
communications (e.g., demystifying risks, reducing surprises) may
protect the public agenda from myopic hysteria or manipulation by
groups with hidden agendas. Risk communications can raise the
understanding of issues or actions and are successful if the public
believes that it is adequately informed. It is unrealistic, however, to
expect that risk communications will necessarily reduce conflict and
23
reassure the public.
"Knowledge of the technical, scientific, and medical aspects of
hazards tends to be low amongst the population at large, but is generally
24
higher for males, younger adults, and better educated individuals."
20 Thompson, To Hell with Turkeys! A Diatribe Directed at the Pernicious
Trepidity of the CurrentIntellectual Debate on Risk, in VALUES AT RISK 113 (D.
MacLean ed. 1986).
21 Whyte & Burton, Perceptionof Risks in Canada,in LING WITH RISK 399 (I.
Burton & R. McCullough eds. 1982).
22

J. SORENSON ET AL., IMPACTS OF HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGY: THE PSYCHO-

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF RESTARTING TMI (1987). Weinberg, Is Nuclear Energy
Acceptable? 33 BULLETINOFTHE ATOMIC SCIENTrISTS 540 (1977).
23 Supra note 15.
24 Supra note 2, at 191.
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However, knowledge does not seem to be correlated with either risk
attitude or perception. 2 5 The degree to which risk communications are
reassuring is a function of the attributes of their source (e.g., legitimacy)
and quality (e.g., accuracy). 26 The congruence of the communicated
message with commonly held risk perceptions is a major determinant in
the selective attention and retention of the communication by the public.
Thus, knowledge of risk perception is vital for effective management of
the regulatory process. A major source of information concerning risk
perception and the regulatory agenda in Canada is public survey data.
The major problem is that "only when problems are already 'issues' do
surveys begin to collect data on the public's perception of them." 27
To anticipate the public response to new hazards or new responses
to existing hazards, one must discover what people mean when they say
that something is (or is not) risky and determine what factors underlie
these perceptions. 2 8 The psychometric paradigm that has been
developed mainly by researchers at Decision Research (Eugene,
Oregon) and various collaborators attempts to understand how
judgments of the riskiness of hazardous activities, substances and
technologies are related to certain attributes of these risks. These
9
include:2
(i) the hazard's status on characteristics that have been
hypothesized to account for risk perceptions and attitudes
(e.g., voluntariness, dread, knowledge, controllability); (ii)
the benefits that each hazard provides to society; (iii) the
number of deaths caused by the hazard in an average year;
(iv) the number of deaths caused by the hazard in a
disastrous year, and (v) the seriousness of each death from a
25 Supra note 21.
26 Supra note 15.
27 Supra note 21, at 49.

28 Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Why Study Risk Perception?2 RISK
ANALYsIs 83 (1982).
29 Id. at 84-85.

2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 281 [Fall 1991]

particular hazard relative to a death due to other causes.
These research efforts consistently confirm that perceived risk is a
multidimensional concept and that only one of those dimensions
corresponds roughly with a formal definition of risk in the sense of rates
30
of fatalities or injuries.
Using psychometric scaling and multivariate analysis techniques, the
Decision Research group 31 concluded that the riskiness judgment of a
hazard is primarily a function of what they defined as (1) "dreadrisk,"
i.e., perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal
consequences and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits, and
(2) "unknown risk," i.e., the degree to which hazards are not
observable, unknown, new and delayed in their manifestation of harm.
A third component of some studies was the number of people exposed
to the hazard.
Vlek and Stallen 32 used an alternative psychometric method to
characterize risk judgments. Their study identified two factors: (1) the
size of a potential accident and (2) the degree of organized safety.
Von Winterfeldt, John and Borcherding 33 tested the accuracy of
perceptions of fatality risks and concluded that: "fatality probability
operates as a primary determinant for intuitive risk judgments; if that
probability is relatively low, and the potential for large scale accidents
increases, disaster potential begins to shape risk judgments." The study
indicates that in a focused public policy debate on acceptable risk where
the potential for large scale disaster is not large, experts and laypersons
may form judgments of risks in a similar way, i.e., on the basis of
30 Cole & Withey, Perspectives on Risk Perceptions, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 143
(1981).
31 Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 ScIENcE 280 (1987).
32 JudgingRisks andBenefits in the Small and in the Large, 28 ORGANIZATIONAL
BMuAVIOUR AND HUMAN PERRRMANCE 235 (1981).
33 Cognitive Components of Risk Ratings, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 286 (1981).
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fatality rates. In such cases the provision of information may reduce the
gap in risk perception.
Clearly, an understanding of the role of risk perception in shaping
the political agenda requires consideration of the ways in which interest
groups can heighten and manipulate fears34 or draw public attention to
hidden, but important, hazards. It is necessary to consider how public
institutions (e.g., courts) and processes (e.g., legal proceedings) define,
mold and legitimize risk perceptions, attitudes and responses to risks.
One must also consider the impact of accidents upon risk perceptions
and the role of such experiences in transforming latent perceptions and
fears into actions (e.g., complaints, political activity, etc.).
The impact that interest groups can have in amplifying and
mobilizing risk perceptions is well documented. The impact is larger
when technical experts disagree, when such disagreement is public, and
when the types of risks are those which rate high on the "dread" and
"unknown" risk dimensions. Their impact is also large if the constraints
they seek to impose do not appear to interfere immediately with
established patterns of behaviour and life styles. 35
The role of accidents in shaping the policy agenda has been a subject
for psychometric research. An important concept that has emerged from
this research is that the seriousness and higher order impacts of an
accident are determined in part by what the event signals. 36
Slovic has gone on to say that:37
An accident that takes many lives may produce
relatively little social disturbance (beyond that experienced
by the victims' families and friends) if it occurs as part of a
familiar and well-understood system (such as a train wreck).
34 See, e.g., M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 4 and SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL CONS'IRUCrIONOF RISK (B.Johnson & V. Covello eds. 1987).
35 Supra note 4.
36 Slovic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, Modeling Societal Impact of FatalAccidents,

30 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 464 (1984).
37 Supra note 31, at 284.
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However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system (or one
perceived as poorly understood)... may have immense social
consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of further and
possibly catastrophic mishaps.
Kasperson et al.3 8 recently developed a conceptual framework that
links the technical assessment of risk with psychological, sociological
and cultural perspectives of risk perception and risk-related behaviour.
They describe a process for the social amplification of risk. This process
involves two major stages - the transfer of information about the risk
or risk event and the response mechanisms triggered in society.
Much remains to be understood about how risk perceptions are
amplified by social processes. However, evidence exists with respect to
the following: (1) Experience with dramatic accidents or risk events
increases the memorability and imaginability of the hazard, thereby
heightening the perception of risk.39 (2) Large volumes of information
about an event may serve as risk amplifiers (e.g., mass media
coverage). 4 0 (3) Disputes among various stakeholders or risk
assessors amplify risk perceptions. 4 1 (4) Reports which explain risks
and the underlying processes that generate them in simple terms
attenuate risk perceptions.
The Risk EstimationPhase
Risk estimation is the process of quantifying the probabilities and
consequence values for identified risks.4 2 Experiments show that a
variety of cognitive biases affect the processing of risk information into
38 The Social Amplification of Risk: A ConceptualFramework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS
177 (1988).
39 Slovic, Informing and Educatingthe Public About Risk, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 403

(1986).
40 Mazur, The Journalistand Technology: Reporting About Love Canaland Three
Mile Island, 22 MINERVA 45 (1984); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DISASTERS

AND THE MASS MEDIA (1980); supranote 38.
41 A. MAZUR, Ti DYNAMICS OF TECHNCAL CONTROvERS
42 Supra note 14.

(1981).
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perceptions concerning probabilities of risky outcomes. 4 3 People have
many shortcomings in acting as an "intuitive statisticians."'44 Because
of their limited cognitive abilities, almost all people employ heuristics
and simplifications in processing information. 45 These mechanisms, as
well as the processes of selective attention and retention of information,
serve people well in many situations, but may bias risk assessment.
Tversky and Kahneman 4 6 have identified three major types of
heuristic mechanisms that even experts tend to use when assessing
probabilities - representativeness, availability, and anchoring and
adjustment.
The first mechanism involves the use of "stereotypes" or
representative images of the conditions associated with an event.4 7
When people assess the probability of the event, they attempt to judge
the similarity of the assessed circumstances to the "ideal" representation
of the event. Therefore, they tend to arrive at a probability as a function
of the similarity or dissimilarity between these circumstances and the
ideal representation. Shear4 8 provided examples of physicians who
judge adverse drug reactions on the basis of superficial similarity in
symptom patterns, thus ignoring key diagnostic clues in the medical
history of the patient and his family.
This representativeness heuristicleads to the following threats to
the validity of probability assessments: 49
43 D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC & A.
HEuPRiscs AND BIASES (1982).

TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:

44 Hogarth, Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability
Distributions,70 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 271 (1975).
45 Hogarth, Process Tracing in Clinical Judgment, 19 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 298
(1974).
46 Judgment under Uncertainty:HeuristicsandBiases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
47 Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness,3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (1972).
48 Shear, ClinicalPerspectives,presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.
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* Ignoring base-rateprobabilities.Differences in frequencies of an
event in a population should be reflected in judgments unless there is
compelling evidence that the event assessed is unique. Experimental
evidence suggests that such statistical information is usually ignored
when subjects are provided with specific detailed information.
* Ignoring sample sizes. Large random samples, by virtue of the
law of large numbers, are similar in character to the population from
which they were drawn. However, small samples do not have this
property. Yet, people tend to make strong inferences about the
population at large from small samples. For example, Shear 50 reports
that clinicians make strong diagnoses about rare conditions even though
the sample of patients that they could possibly observe is too small on
which to base any general inference.
• Ignoringpredictability.The representativeness heuristic tends to
reduce an assessor's inclination to examine critically the predictive
validity of the information at hand. Thus people tend to associate less
risk with an event or action that is favorably described and to associate
more risk with one described less favorably. This occurs despite the fact
that the degree to which the description is favorable is unaffected by the
reliability of the description or by the degree to which it permits accurate
prediction.
* Having illusions of validity. Confidence about predictions should
refer to the reliability and adequacy of data, not to the association it
evokes about the similarity of the description to some stereotypical
program.
* Ignoring regression toward the mean. One should expect
performance significantly above the mean to regress to the mean in
subsequent observations. Similarly, performance significantly below the
49 Supra note 46.

50 Supra note 48.
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mean is more likely to improve. Assessors tend to ignore this because it
is incompatible with the belief that the value of outcome variables should
51
be as extreme as the value of input variables.
The second frequently used mechanism of probability assessment is
called the availability heuristic. It occurs when people relate the
probability of an event to the ease with which they can imagine it
happening, or the frequency with which they have encountered similar
events in the past. The main problem with this is that the ease of
imagining an event has much more to do with its salience and
complexity than its frequency. Johnson 52 pointed out that people can
easily imagine the occurrence and consequences of cancer or
malformation of fetuses, but they have difficulty with aplastic anemia or
agranulocytosis. Thus the probability and consequences of the latter
tend to be underestimated. Judgment using this heuristic is also
influenced by the special training and experiences of the assessor.
Similarly, the frequency with which one remembers encountering an
event depends on not only its objective frequency but also its salience.
This mechanism is especially subject to bias because people selectively
observe and recall events. Public perceptions, for example, are affected
more by dramatic reports in the mass media (e.g., Three Mile Island or
the Mississauga train derailment) than by well-documented scientific
studies. A recent television presentation on Thalidomide victims did
more to shape public perceptions than dissemination of details about
extensive drug safety evaluation programs. 53 Also, because recall
tends to fade over time, the availability heuristic results in a bias
-towards recent events.
The third heuristic of probability assessment is called anchoringand
adjustment. The process of eliciting probabilities typically starts with an
51 Supra note 46.
52 Supra note 1.
53 Supra note 12.
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apparently reasonable initial value (called an "anchor"). Then, as
pertinent information is acquired, the initial estimate is adjusted. There is
substantial evidence that the degree of adjustment is insufficient and that
the initial estimate (even if arbitrary) plays a significant role in the
determination of a final estimate of the probability in question. By
starting with different initial values, one can affect the final value
elicited. A similar phenomenon reported by Edwards 5 4 was the
tendency of experts to be conservative when new information became
available, i.e., they did not revise probabilities in accordance with the
revision rates prescribed by Bayes theorem.
Psychologists have also noted other biases. (1) The mode of
presenting data influences the assessment process. Vivid, interesting,
qualitative data has more influence on the assessment than dull,
quantitative data. 55 (2) Context affects the perceived variability of
outcomes. The assessment of the variability of a series of numbers is
affected by the absolute size of the numbers. 56 (3) There is a tendency
to assign higher probabilities to events which please a person or their
superiors. 57 (4) Small probabilities are generally overestimated and
large probabilities tend to be underestimated. (5) There is a tendency to
overestimate the joint probability of independent events and to
underestimate probabilities of disjunctive events. 58 (6) Estimations of
probability distributions tend to be too tight, i.e., the variance is
underestimated. The assessment of extreme fractiles is particularly prone
to bias. 59
54 Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in FORMAL
REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (B. Kleinmutz ed. 1968).

55 Supra note 44.
56 Lalirop,PerceivedVariability,73 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 490 (1967).
57 Sanders, Skill in Forecasting Daily Temperature and Precipitation:Some
ExperimentalResults, 54 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOCY 1171 (1973).
58 Moskowitz & Wallenius, Conditional versus Joint ProbabilityAssessment, 22
CANADIAN J. OPERATIONAL RES. AND INFO. PROCESSING 116 (1984).
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to bias. 59
While perceptual and cognitive biases may reduce the quality of risk
estimation, the attributes of the process and the way its results are
communicated may also affect risk perceptions adversely.
The Risk EvaluationPhase
"Risk evaluation is the complex process of defining acceptable levels
of risk to individuals or society. It concerns what risks/injuries can be
accepted having regard to risk groups, risk environment, etc." 60 Public
risk perceptions should be considered in the evaluation process both as a
reflection of the need for anxiety reduction and as an important factor in
determining the potential for "ripple effects."
As we have observed, professional risk assessors tend to discount
qualitative attributes of risky situations and instead to focus on what
they perceive as objective measures. By doing so, they forget that public
concerns are a real social phenomenon that public safety programs can
partially alleviate. Of course one may look for other means to deal with
anxieties such as public education, but ignoring public anxieties or
giving them little attention violates the basic tenet of consumer
sovereignty. It also ignores that certain areas of safety are perceived by
the public as the sole domain and responsibility of government (as
opposed to other domains where individual safety behaviour is
perceived to be indicated). The denial of public expectations may lead to
the erosion of public trust in the regulatory process and eventual political
intervention.
Perhaps more important is the threat of "ripple effects" that can
unleash tidal waves. Some accidents that were not prevented can trigger
higher-order consequences that are far more devastating than the damage
of the accidents themselves. These potential higher-order impacts must
59 Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, Calibrationof Probabilities:The State of

Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRISTIcs AND BIAsEs, supra
note 43.
60 Supra note 14, at 26.
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be considered when evaluating the benefits of a safety program. It may
be appropriate to allocate resources to prevent an accident even when the
direct impacts of the accident are likely to be small and its probability
low, if a single instance of the accident can trigger events which lead to
a serious interruption of social processes and the functioning of social
institutions. For example, it is in the interest of both government and
pharmaceutical companies to prevent accidents or risks in over-thecounter markets that may lead to public hysteria and destruction of that
market through excessive regulation or significant and undesirable
changes in consumer patterns.
Another important phenomenon that can influence the quality of
decisions in the risk evaluation phase is theframing effect which shows
that one's perceptions and judgments can be significantly influenced by
the way in which issues are stated. Tversky and Kahneman 6 1 have
conducted a series of experiments which demonstrate the serious effects
that problem framing can have on risk benefit judgments. It appears that
decision makers will take risks to avoid a "sure loss," but are
conservative when "sure gains" are involved. By altering the reference
system for defining a problem and formulating problems in terms of
"gains" rather than "losses," one evokes a conservative bias and viceversa. The regulation of health, safety and the environment is especially
vulnerable to these problems because framing choice options in terms of
lives gained or lost magnifies this phenomenon. [High emotional content
and large uncertainty are fertile grounds for the rise of bias,
manipulation and sharp disagreements.
Finally, another important bias occurs because low probability, but
very harmful, risks tend to be judged by the public in terms of their
consequences rather than their probabilities. 62 In contrast, regulators
61 Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
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tend to focus upon the expected values of consequences and discount
the risks with very small probabilities.
The Risk Reduction and ControlPhase
"Risk reduction is the action of lowering the probability of
occurrence and/or the value of a risk consequence, thereby reducing the
magnitude of the risk"63 The actions involved may range from tight
regulatory constraints or prohibitions of certain technologies, products,
behaviour, etc. to activities which enhance voluntary actions (e.g.,
informational and educational programs) or to nonaction. The choice
among these options and their implementation is influenced by risk
perception in several ways. Generally, "people respond to hazards they
perceive. If their perceptions are faulty, efforts at public and
'6 4
environmental protection are likely to be misdirected."
Knowledge of risk perception is important in selecting an
implementation strategy for reducing risk. Such a strategy might include
programs to modify perceptions, to enhance individual safety
behaviour, to alleviate fears so a regulatory program will be more
acceptable, or to amplify risk so political support for a program can be
mustered.
Specific perceptual problems must be dealt with at this stage. These
include reconciling divergent opinions about risk among experts,
regulators and laypeople, as well as improving knowledge of laypeople
about safety-enhancing activities and risk management skills.
The risk reduction phase should include a control (or follow-up)
phase where program implementation is monitored. The control phase
should include activities to control and mitigate accidents and other risks
as they occur. These activities must include both the dissemination of
warning and emergency information and actions to contain unproductive
62

Whyte, supra note 8.

63 Supra note 14, at 26.
64 Supra note 5, at 181.
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ripple effects. Risk communication informed by an understanding of
risk perceptions is key to any successful control strategy.
Risk Communication
We have emphasized the important effects that risk perceptions can
have in molding regulatory risk reduction programs and determining
their success. We have also stressed that the key control variable in
modifying risk perceptions and influencing the degree to which risk
perceptions trigger action is the communication pattern associated with
the regulatory process. Covello, von Winterfeldt and Slovic observed
that:65
Risk communication takes place in a variety of forms,
ranging from product warning labels on cigarette packages
and saccharin bottles to interactions between officials and
members of the public on such highly charged issues as
Love Canal, AIDS, and the accident at Three Mile Island.
Recent experience has shown that communicating scientific
information about health and environmental risks can be
exceedingly difficult and is often frustrating to those
involved.
Typical problems involve complaints from regulators, industry and
scientific experts that the public does not understand technical issues and
that its perceptions are formed by irrational fears, biased media and the
influence of groups with hidden agendas. The public often interprets
government and industry inaction as lack of concern and interest. Risk
messages are also often viewed as manipulative.
Covello, von Winterfeldt and Slovic 6 6 reviewed the literature on
efforts to communicate information about health and environmental
65 Communicating Scientific Information about Health and EnvironmentalRisks:
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risks. They suggested that communication problems arise from (a)
message characteristics and problems (e.g., limitations of scientific
assessments), (b) source characteristics and problems (e.g., limitations
of risk communicators and risk assessment experts), (c) channel
characteristics (e.g., limitations in the means or media by which
scientific information about health or environmental risk is transmitted)
and (d) receiver characteristics (e.g., characteristics of the intended
recipient of the communication).
The directions to improve communications include the following: 67
(1) Equip the public through education with basic knowledge
and skills to understand scientific facts about risks (a long
term strategy).
(2) Relate the risk message simply and without complex
technical terms.
(3) Reduce public confrontation among technical experts, in
particular the type of confrontation that is induced by
adversarial processes.
(4) Involve knowledgeable public representatives in risk
assessment processes.
(5) Design communication messages that deal with the
qualitative aspects of risk perceptions.
(6) Avoid or counter balance media reporting that
emphasizes drama.
(7) Avoid over-simplifications and distortions.
(8) Provide a balanced discussion of risks and benefits.
(9) Provide guidance to action.
Underlying this approach is the idea that after informed debate,
consumers tend to behave in ways which achieve socially optimal levels
of safety. Thus individuals must be presented with relevant information
in effective ways. Presenting information effectively requires making it
available in the right place, at the right time and to the right audience. It
67 With regard to item 6, see Gunter and Wober, Television Viewing and Public
Perceptions of Harzards to Life, 3 J. ENVTL PSYCHOLOGY 325 (1983). Their
evidence implies that the media has less effect in forming risk perceptions than is
widely believed.
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also requires that the message be interpreted correctly. 6 8 Design of
effective communication requires understanding the mental models used
by people in analyzing risk and choosing actions.
MacGregor, 69 for example, examined the effective use of warning
70
labels. He observed:
For a warning to be effective, it must be noticed by the
product user. The easier it is for an individual to gain access
to the warning, for example, the greater the likelihood that it
will be read.... Designing effective warnings, however, also
requires attention to psychological factors associated with
information processing and risk perception.
He points out that the language used in the warning should not be too
complex: 71
A warning can also fail on language grounds if its choice
of terms to express product risks are misunderstood. This
can happen either because the context in which the warning
is presented is ambiguous or because risk-related terms
having a precise meaning to technical experts are interpreted
more broadly by a lay audience.
The warning must fit into the individual's knowledge structure (or
mental model) associated with its domain because it is interpreted and
coded within the existing knowledge structure.
An alternative communication strategy is one that aims to modify
behaviour. The focus is on the "presentation format" for delivering
information and effecting behavioural change. Kline and Leiss 7 2
provided examples of strategies for designs of health hazard warnings
68 Supra note 7 and MacGregor, Inferences About Product Risks: A Mental
Modeling Approach to Evaluating Warnings, 12 J. PRODS. LIAB. 75 (1989)
[hereinafter INFERENCES ABOUT PRODUCTRIsKs]. See also, Wright, Creighton &
Threlfall, Some Factors Determining When Instructions Will Be Read, 25
ERGONOMICS 131 (1982).
69 INFERENCES ABOUT PRODUCT RisKs, supra.

70 Id. at 75.
71 Id. at 76.
72 Supra note 7.
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which employ modem advertising and marketing techniques to modify
behaviour. The effectiveness of a communication is seen as a function
of modifying not only the information base and the cognitive processes
of individuals but also their attitudes and values. They base their
approach upon the conceptual work of Beltramini 73 who identified two
relevant categories for health advisory messages - information content
and presentation format. The experimental approach that underlies the
strategic choice of communications seeks to identify attitudinal and
behavioural changes resulting from the assimilation of the alternative
contents, forms and dissemination patterns of messages. The strategic
choice is based on four elements: positioning, choice of a marketing
concept, market segmentation and choice of an effective medium.
While the focus of many communication studies is on the flow of
information from risk managers to the public, one must recognize that
what the public feels about risk must also be communicated effectively
to regulators. Risk communication is a two-way process. To be
effective, it must ensure that the public has effective channels of
74
communication to risk managers.
The Special Case of Risk Perception and Drug Regulation
"Pharmaceuticals have become common in everyday life, having
advantages and disadvantages. Almost everybody uses drugs at one
time or another, seeking the benefits and accepting the risks". 75 Some
drugs are freely available (i.e., over-the-counter), others can be readily
prescribed by a physician and still others are further restricted. In all
cases, risks are influenced by the behaviour of individuals as affected by
73 Perceived Believability of Warning Information Presentedin CigaretteLabel

Advertising, 17 J. ADVERTISING 26 (1988).
74 Supra note 9.
75 Jungerman, Schutz & Thuring, Mental Models in Risk Assessment: Informing
PeopleAbout Drugs,8 RISK ANALYsIS 147 (1988).
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their knowledge. In the over-the-counter market, information about
risks is more difficult to disseminate because of the lack of precise
targeting. Also, over-the-counter marketing itself suggests low risk.
The current process of regulating pharmaceuticals in Canada and the
U.S. reflects public risk perceptions in an implicit rather than an explicit
manner. In general, evaluation of new drugs at the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration is consistent with the acceptance of greater risk for
greater gain. If a new drug offers little potential advantage over existing
drugs for an illness that is not life-threatening, but is relatively common,
a fairly large data base would be needed to provide acceptable evidence
of safety. On the other hand, if a new drug offers an important benefit
for treatment of a serious illness, especially where there are no
satisfactory drugs available, approval would require significantly less
data. An important element in ensuring a credible system is openness,
generally in the form of open advisory committee meetings with free
discussion among scientists. Selection of knowledgeable and reputable
scientists for advisory committees is vital to process quality, but even
well qualified scientists need experience and training in the particulars of
the scientific regulatory functions. Lack of experience and use of ad hoc
76
committees can adversely affect the quality of decisions.
Lack of understanding by laypeople can lead to fears and pressures
on regulatory agencies that hinder their efforts. Tight constraints do not
necessarily mean more safety because many drug choices trade off risks
along several dimensions to minimize total risk. Indeed, when some
drugs are eliminated, less effective and riskier substitutes may take their
place. 77
Prescribed drugs involve physicians as intermediaries. As a result,
their use is affected by the relationship between patient and doctor and
76 Temple, Risk Perception and Drug Safety Evaluation in the United States,

presentation to Ottawa Workshop, supra.
77 Supra note 1.
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the risk perception of doctor and patient (as influenced by the doctor).
. Pharmaceuticals are usually purchased and consumed voluntarily,
although those with more serious ailments may view their actions as not
totally voluntary. The risks are typically immediate (e.g., side effects)
and in many cases reversible if discovered. With prescription
pharmaceuticals, patients typically accept the superior knowledge of the
physician and delegate, in part, their decision-making authority. Thus,
pharmaceuticals fall into a category of risks that involve lower "dread"
and "unknown" characteristics but are susceptible to moderate ripple
effects. These risks will be lower in situations involving prescription
drugs and higher for unexplained risks in the over-the-counter market.
These observations have been confirmed by preliminary studies of
9
risk perception of prescription drugs in both Canada 78 and Sweden. 7
In contrast to high risk perceptions generally associated with the use of
other chemicals, no fears of prescription drugs were evident.
Prescription drugs, with the exception of sleeping pills and
antidepressants, were perceived as rather high in benefit and
low in risk. They appeared to be sharply differentiated from
other chemicals and from illicit drugs. The concerns about
sleeping pills and antidepressants perhaps can be traced to
extensive media publicity during recent years regarding the
risks of addiction and overdose from these and similar
drugs. 80
However, pharmaceuticals were seen as sending a strong warning
signal when adverse reactions did occur.
The Swedish study asked respondents how they viewed the risks of
various hazards over time. Although most risks examined (e.g.,
chemicals, heart disease, cancer, climatic change and travel) were seen
78
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as greater now than in the past, this was not true for prescription drugs.
The potential for ripple effects was evident in responses of survey
participants to a report of a suspected, but not proven, link between a
drug and some fatalities.
At a hint of trouble, 75% of those surveyed wanted the drug
removed from the market. However, one of the most
intriguing findings in this study was the indication that
evidence of safety and efficacy, in combination with warning
information, could reverse a high proportion of these initial
demands for withdrawal of the drug. 8 1
This survey indicates that drug regulation may be less adversely
affected by distorted public risk perceptions than other areas. This may
be a result of the tight regulatory process and the evidence of safety in
the drug industry. However, the increase in the market share of nonprescription drugs, the increased potential for accidents and the
deterioration of patient-doctor relationships (resulting from heightened
demand) suggest that the potential for ripple effects may increase.
The aspect of risk perception that currently dominates discussion
concerns over-confidence in self medication and lack of confidence in
instructions and warnings. Indeed, most empirical research on drug risk
perceptions focuses upon the search for effective ways to disseminate
information to improve patients' safety behaviour.
Our discussion of the risk perceptions associated with drugs has so
far reflected only one aspect of perception, namely the aggregate
response of the public as individuals. Many of the problems with risk
perception that drug regulators face, however, stem from two other
processes of forming what appear to be public perceptions: (1) the
actions of "victims", lawyers and judges, and (2) the actions of interest
groups with hidden agendas as discussed below.
The fact that prescription drugs are used by persons at higher risk
81 Id.at 110.
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than the population at large means that fatalities are likely to be
spuriously correlated with their use. The uncertainties inherent in the
practice of medicine, coupled with the natural uncertainty of product
innovation, create ambiguities with respect to the management of
medication for particular patients. Regulators may view a drug as
beneficial from the statistical point of view that must guide their
decisions in the public interest. In specific cases this drug may be
viewed by the court (justly or unjustly) to be responsible for adverse
effects incurred by a specific patient (e.g., someone who is
oversensitive to the toxicity of the drug).
Litigation tends to create a focal point for the formation of small, but
highly emotional groups, with heightened risk perceptions. This process
creates "news" that allows narrowly based risk perceptions to
disproportionately influence public risk perceptions. This in turn
influences the political process. The strong concentration and dedication
of people with amplified risk perceptions regarding drug safety (e.g.,
victims of adverse reactions) and the diffuse distribution of people who
enjoy the drug benefits create an imbalanced political perspective. The
outrage of identifiable victims, rather than the invisible, statistical net
benefits of regulatory action, will dominate public opinion. This
phenomenon requires a communication strategy designed to inoculate
public opinion regarding benefits before a crisis emerges because later
communications may be regarded as "white wash."
The second process to be managed is the social amplification of risk
perceptions by groups with hidden agendas. Those adversely affected
by drugs provide such groups an opportunity for public expression of
frustration and resentment. Crisis management is required, but, again, a
long term communication strategy will reduce the chance that adverse
reactions will be viewed as evidence of indifference to safety.
Such a communication strategy may aim to fulfill several objectives.
First, it may try to reduce public fears that can paralyze the regulators
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and the market - and pose increased risk. Integrity and openness
creates an atmosphere of trust that alleviates public fears. It also
depoliticizes the risk issues in the long run.
Second, it may seek to mitigate crises of confidence in regulatory
agencies and to anticipate feelings of outrage that may result from low
probability events by improving the dissemination of scientific
information to the public. However, scientists are not necessarily the
best risk communicators. The development of communication support
systems (e.g., teams consisting of both scientists and communications
specialists) to provide information to the public is part of what we earlier
called a long term inoculation strategy. Moreover, crises of confidence
can be avoided with post-market surveillance to provide early warnings
of adverse drug reactions.
Finally, it may try to encourage behaviour of physicians and patients
designed to reduce safety risks with strategies such as the "brutal
candor" use screening system. 82 This system requires the patient to
learn about a drug and to be tested before being permitted to use it.
Also, e.g., provincial benefit approval systems may require doctors to
use only certain drugs if they expect their costs to be reimbursed by the
plan. 83 Further, behavioural modification strategies commonly used in
marketing may be used. However, these must be carefully targeted and
well designed to be effective, and ethical concerns must be carefully
considered. Strategies to improve "mental models" associated with drug
use (i.e., to correct misperceptions about facts) and encourage informed
behaviour are perhaps less effective in the short run but more acceptable
in a democratic society in the longer term.
To be effective, a communication strategy must be integrated and it
must consider synergies and externalities. Piecemeal approaches may
82 MacGregor, supra note 7.
83 Supra note 1.
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create contradictory impacts and undesirable (or unanticipated) effects.
Summary and Conclusions
We. have discussed how public risk perceptions interact with the
regulatory process used to promote public safety. We have given special
attention to the many reasons why regulators must understand how
public risk perceptions are created and influenced. We have shown how
perceptions play a key role in the identification of risks, their estimation
and evaluation, and strategies for their reduction and control. We have
applied this conceptual framework to the important area of public risk
perceptions in drug safety evaluation and conclude that a strategic
approach to communications can reduce counter productive impacts of
public perceptions. Such an approach can also provide a welfareimproving reflection of public risk preferences; consistent with the
prime objective of informed individual and public decisions.
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